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 BUZZING TOO FAR? THE IDEOLOGICAL ECHO OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
CONCEPTS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF THE MAFUNGAUTSI 
FOREST IN ZIMBABWE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article critically examines the effects of global development paradigms on the local level. 
Familiar examples of these ‘buzzwords’, are ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, ‘capacity 
building’, ‘good governance’ and ‘sustainable development’. The article presents the findings 
of a highly exceptional, but therefore very suitable case: a community-based forestry project 
in the Mafungautsi State Forest in Zimbabwe. This project used the same buzzwords 
throughout its two phases from 1994 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003, but with remarkably 
different outcomes per phase. Only when the first donor left in 1999 due to Zimbabwe 
becoming an international pariah, was there space for another donor to reconceptualise the 
same buzzwords on different premises, leading to more positive outcomes. The paper 
concludes that, although rare in today’s donor driven target culture, locally appropriate and 
critical operationalisation of buzzwords is possible even if, or perhaps when, it takes place 
under unthinkable circumstances. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of ‘buzzwords’ defined as policy catchwords or development concepts is nothing 
new (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Conceptual frameworks in terms of specific wordings are of 
all times and form a fact of life in human societies where language is the principal mode of 
communication. But since all conceptual frameworks carry meaning and specific 
connotations, one has to be aware of their impact and effects. This article aims to do just that: 
to critically examine the effects of global development paradigms on the local level. Familiar 
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 examples of these ‘buzzwords’, are ‘empowerment’, ‘participation’, ‘capacity building’, 
‘good governance’ and ‘sustainable development’. From the literature, it is clear that policy 
concepts devised and operationalised in one part of the globe influence processes, institutions 
and developments in other parts of the world (Peet and Watts, 1993; Reinicke, 1998), with 
often the developed countries at the originating and developing countries at the receiving end. 
What is not clear, however, is how far this influence goes and how the effects of specific 
global conceptual frameworks on local processes and institutions can be characterised, even 
though they are often regarded as negative (Reinicke, 1998). Yet, despite being aware of 
possible negative impacts of buzzwords, Hicky and Mohan, in their study of participation, 
warn not to throw away the baby with the bathwater and so ‘losing those elements of 
participation that retain the potential to catalyse and underpin genuine processes of 
transformation’ (Hicky and Mohan, 2005: 257). They recommend that ‘the conditions within 
which participation can be transformative, and the forms of politics that underpin such an 
approach, need to be closely delineated and analyzed’ (Idem: 257). This then asks of us to not 
only examine how discourse influences behaviour, but also to analyse the complex 
interactions between discourse, institutions, leadership, and other sources of change. This is 
what we intend to do in this article by using the relationship between global development 
concepts and Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) in Southern Africa.  
 
The research reported here is based on a case study approach of a CBFM project in the 
Mafungautsi State Forest in Zimbabwe. In 1994, a joint management pilot project was set up 
by the Zimbabwe Forestry Commission, with assistance from a donor, the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), in order to generate lessons for the scaling up of 
such initiatives to other state forests in the country. Due to disappointing results and the 
overall decreasing donor interest as Zimbabwe became an international pariah, this project 
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 was prematurely terminated in 1999. It was soon thereafter resuscitated by a team of 
researchers from the Centre for International Forestry Research’s (CIFOR) Adaptive 
Collaborative Management project (ACM), based in Zimbabwe. The ACM team used a 
different approach to forestry co-management, centred on enhancing social learning and 
collaboration among stakeholders. This provided space for stakeholders at the start of the 
project to come to grips with problems – and possible solutions - on their own terms. These 
two opposing outsets of the two phases of the project allows for an interesting comparison as 
it makes a division between what can be seen as more ‘globalised’ and more ‘localised’ 
conceptualisations of what are the problems at hand in Mafungautsi and what solutions can be 
developed to address them. 
 
The article starts with a critical discussion of global governance buzzwords. Next, we provide 
some contextual background information on the development of forest policy in Zimbabwe 
and our case study area. This leads us to a description of the two phases of the Mafungautsi 
project, after which these are compared according to the buzzwords ownership, good 
governance, capacity building, participation and sustainable development. The article 
concludes by answering the question whether neoliberal global governance concepts are 
‘buzzing too far’ into local level CBFM practices in Zimbabwe and outlines implications for 
development theory more general. 
 
2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE BUZZWORDS 
When we talk about ‘global governance buzzwords’, three concepts, and their interrelations, 
need to be discussed: ‘global’, ‘governance’, and ‘buzzwords’. We can be brief about the 
concept ‘global’. Since it is an adjective giving the connotation of ‘encompassing the whole 
world’ to a noun, we can just accept it as such. Of course, one can say that the adjective 
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 ‘global’ does not actually say how far the connotation goes, but the purpose of this article is to 
delve into this very question. With the next concept of (global) governance we find ourselves 
in more complex theoretical waters. Governance has been defined in so many ways that 
searching for an all-encompassing definition would be futile. Rather we outline what we think 
are important theoretical connotations to the concept, which are useful for the purpose of this 
article. We commence with the difference between government and governance.  
 
According to Rosenau (2001: 1), both government and governance ’consist of rule systems, of 
steering mechanisms through which authority is exercised in order to enable the governed to 
preserve their coherence and move towards desired goals’. However, governance is a much 
broader concept than government, and distinguishes itself by its emphasis on ‘any collectivity 
– private or public – that employs informal as well as formal steering mechanisms to make 
demands, frame goals, issue directives, pursue policies and generate compliance’ (idem: 1, 
emphasis added). Government thus focuses more on formal systems of rule or steering 
mechanisms, usually at either local, regional, national or international levels. From the 
literature, it is evident that as a result of forces of globalisation a shift can be discerned from 
formal state-centred government to more informal governance, encompassing a wide range of 
actors, with differing levels of power in constantly changing alliances (Rosenau, 1997, 2001). 
 
The fact that more and more actors are involved in constructing, influencing and 
implementing (environmental) policy renders power in the policy-process exceedingly diffuse 
and no longer a primacy of the state or bound to a specific locale (Biermann and Dingwerth, 
2004). Increasingly, this has lead to the situation that ‘the activities of external intervening 
agents can deeply influence the relationship of local communities with the natural resources’ 
(Dietz, 1996: 44). Global actors more and more entitle themselves the right to intervene in and 
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 influence events at the local level, wherever this ‘local’ may be. In Southern Africa, this can 
be seen happening through the buying up of park lands by wealthy Western wildlife patrons, 
who then govern these parks on the basis of preservationist or protectionist principles 
(Büscher and Dietz, 2005)1. Naturally, these are sensitive developments in a region beset by 
conflicts over land and resources, where a continuously expanding number of actors are 
already grappling with ‘hot’ governance issues, such as decentralisation of authority, changes 
in tenure and incentive structures and the link between conservation and development (Boyd, 
2001). 
 
Another feature of modern (global) governance is that structures are opaque and 
simultaneously consist of fragmentative and integrative forces (Rosenau, 1997). With so 
many different actors on the scene, all with their own different agendas, backgrounds, visions 
and capabilities, contradictions are bound to be plentiful and one-dimensional frameworks 
hard to pursue. Still, this is not to say that structures do not exist at all. They are just not very 
tangible, often inconsistent and undoubtedly very complex. One identifiable form of structure 
lies in the construction of discursive configurations, together forming macro-ideological 
frameworks. Here is where we are getting to our last of the three concepts to be discussed: the 
global governance buzzwords. 
 
Unlike governance, the term ‘buzzword’ has not been defined often. Here we describe it as a 
language unit that is produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices, 
which is widely used and accepted in many different contexts and through which meaning is 
transferred2. Global governance buzzwords thus denote language units with strong ideological 
                                                          
1 Preservationism or protectionism are generally regarded as the strictest forms of conservation whereby use of 
natural resources is not allowed and humans should refrain as much as possible from intervening is natural 
processes and landscapes. 
2 Adapted from Hajer’s definition of policy discourse (Hajer, 1997: 44). 
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 and interpretative connotations, which are produced, reproduced and transformed in a 
particular set of practices and used and accepted in many different global rule systems and 
steering mechanism contexts. Together, these buzzwords make up a substantive part of the so-
called global governance agenda that guides the formal development parameters insisted on 
by the majority of donors and international development agencies. We have already 
mentioned a few, but a more extensive, albeit not exhaustive list could include: sustainable 
development, empowerment, participation, capacity or institution building, (strengthening of) 
civil society, public-private partnerships and good governance. It is important to note here that 
buzzwords differ from discourses. While discourses are ensembles of particular words or 
phrases denoting a specific ideological meaning, buzzwords are individual language units that 
can be used without necessary reference to other words or phrases comprising a discourse. As 
such they might seem more disconnected of meaning, but we argue that this is not the case. 
All the above mentioned buzzwords stand, like discourses (Arts and van Tatehove, 2002), for 
‘interpretative schemes’ by which meaning is portrayed.  
 
It is fairly safe to state that the ideological interpretation and operationalisation of global 
governance concepts is predominantly derived from Western countries. After all, this is where 
94 percent of all indexed scientific knowledge originates and where capacity to promote this 
knowledge is available (Karlsson, 2002). This incredible domination of discursive power is 
also shown by the fact that buzzwords often do not even get translated anymore when 
introduced into a non-English language (Ergun and Cali, 2002). While this statement may 
seem trivial, the consequences may be quite far-reaching. Buzzwords, like discourses, 
operationalised in one place and context may not necessarily be suitable in any other place or 
context. From the literature, we have distilled three ways how this could work out: 1) the 
ideological operationalisation of the buzzword; 2) contradicting conceptions within the 
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 buzzword and 3) loss of meaning through the usage of buzzwords for political legitimation. 
 
The first, widely accepted, argument why one has to be careful using global governance 
buzzwords on a global scale is because the ideological operationalisation of the concept may 
not suit just any place or context, with its own specific culture, history and (political-) 
ideological settings. Many writers specifically refer to the neoliberal discourse, with its 
emphasis on economic and financial logic, privatisation and liberalisation, as the basis on 
which influential global players, such as the IMF, World Bank, the UN, the USA and the EU, 
devise and operationalise the global governance agenda (Peet and Watts, 1993; Adejumobi, 
2000; Tsheola, 2002; Rosenau, 2003). Rosenau, for instance, states that ‘sustainable 
development ‘now (…) connotes (…) with the emphasis on sustaining economies rather than 
nature, a semantic shift that has enabled a vast array of diverse actors to crowd under the 
umbrella of sustainability and to press their goals in the context of what they regard as 
unquestionable sets of values’ (2003: 16). Global governance buzzwords in this sense thus 
directly denote neoliberal values, which are portrayed as being unquestionable and universally 
applicable. That this assertion itself is very questionable or at least heavily contested can for 
example be demonstrated by the overwhelming critique on the former structural adjustment 
policies of the IMF and World Bank (Schatz, 1994). 
 
The second argument why global governance buzzwords should be treated with care is that 
they are often contradictory in nature, or to other buzzwords. Weiss for example explains that 
the World Banks position on good governance is ‘preoccupied with public sector 
management, the reduction of transactions costs and contract enforcement’ and as such 
contrasts with governance approaches that support local participation and empowerment 
(2000: 804). Clearly, the latter two buzzwords are crucial within the theory and practice of 
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 CBFM. Jan Pronk, former Dutch minister for Development Cooperation, recently gave 
another example (Pronk, 2004). Building on his vast international experience, Pronk also 
argued that buzzwords like good governance are operationalised on the basis of western 
notions of development or progress, which contain contradictory elements that could be 
harmful or even outright negative for the development of the African continent. According to 
Pronk, good governance is latently used in a (neoliberal) context of stability. Development, 
however, implies change, leading to a different allocation of resources and capital, which by 
definition involves a restructuring of the status quo. In Africa in particular, changes in the 
status quo often involve conflict or even violence, and thus call for policies aimed at conflict 
resolution. In contrast, the static conception of good governance in a context of stability 
focuses more on conflict control and as such does neither contribute to the dynamic process of 
development nor to ownership over Africa’s development by Africans themselves. 
 
These two arguments feed into the last argument put forward here that buzzwords are often 
included into all sorts of management, policy or governance documents for the single purpose 
of political legitimation (Mosse, 2005). Many actors depending on donor support feel they 
have to speak the donor language and subsequently feel obliged to incorporate ownership, 
sustainable development, participation and other ‘mobilising metaphors’ (Idem) into their 
texts. While we have already argued that we should be cautious for reasons of predetermined 
or contradictory content, the usage of buzzwords might also be hazardous for the reason of 
lack of content altogether. Clearly, when using a (foreign) word to explain or describe an 
issue, one not only tags along (‘foreign’) meaning, but also looses the option of developing a 
concept or word that states what is actually meant or wanted in the domestic language (Ergun 
and Cali, 2002; Eriksen, 2005). Hence, loss of meaning occurs, while it is essential in local 
development that local actors can describe or explain development in such a way that is has 
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 local meaning. After all, this is (or should be) what the popular buzzword of ownership is 
based on. 
 
Concluding, it has to be noted that the issue of global governance buzzwords is not something 
that has arisen in a historical vacuum. On the contrary; contemporary global governance 
buzzwords are arguably the latest episode in a long historical context of Western domination 
over Africa (Cooper, 2001). Hence, one needs be very sensitive to, and even critical of the 
discursive side of development processes. We now turn to a case of local ‘sustainable 
development’ through Community Based Forest Management in Zimbabwe in order to 
analyse the effects of global governance concepts in the context of the above discussion. 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORESTRY POLICIES IN ZIMBABWE 
In order to sketch the context in which the projects in the Mafungautsi forest took place, this 
section will briefly describe the development of forestry policies in Zimbabwe. The forestry 
policy-making process in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) has been highly influenced by policies 
used by the British Empire (now the Commonwealth) Forestry Association. According to 
Matose, the ‘Association forms the knowledge centre through which peripheral places like the 
Rhodesia Forestry Commission had access to forest conservation arguments which influenced 
policy framing in order to command and control forests in their own boundaries and 
territories’ (Matose, 2002: 53). Because of limited staff, the officials from the Rhodesia 
Forestry Commission depended on information and knowledge from institutions such as the 
Oxford Forestry Commission in order to formulate forestry policies, and it is only around the 
1990s that results from local indigenous forest research began to filter into the policy making 
process (Pearce and Gumbo, 1993).  
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 The biodiversity and watershed conservation debates that dominated earlier in the century 
centred around scientific arguments on the relationships between climate, deforestation and 
hydrology. According to Matose (2001: 70): ‘hydrology and climate were highly topical 
within the empire debates up to the 1940s, but their significance in policy framing has 
diminished since then’. However, ideas on the role of forests in watershed conservation have 
continued to persist in forest policy formulation, also in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Debates 
during the commonwealth forestry conferences were centred on the conviction that 
indigenous forests in most countries lie on Kalahari sands that are fragile and susceptible to 
erosion and therefore need protection. This conviction also influenced forestry policy 
formulation in Rhodesia, resulting in the demarcation of most forests as state forests to be 
managed in a top-down fashion by the Forestry Department. Moreover, because some of the 
forests in the commonwealth countries were rich in commercial timber species, there were 
debates earlier in the century on how best production from these forests could be maintained 
and sustained in the commonwealth countries. According to Matose, ‘the sustained yield 
agenda was set in motion with the resolution on the forest technique at the Commonwealth 
Forestry conference of 1923 that spelt out the need for sound management. This entailed 
working plans for regulating yield, spelt-out objectives, the calculation and regulation of the 
yield to be obtained from each forest, and a spread of age classes of trees for future harvest’ 
(2001: 61). At this conference, all governments were urged to come up with management 
plans that would ensure sustained yields of forest products.  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the policies that were crafted in the early years of 
the 20th century were protectionist in nature. However, because of the other international 
debates on failure of the protectionist way of managing natural resources in the late 1980s 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001), ideas on people centred approaches began to filter in the policy 
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 making process in Zimbabwe3. The Forestry Act began to allow experiments with such 
approaches, and this resulted in the initiation of the pilot resource-sharing project in 
Mafungautsi State Forest, where the Forestry Commission (FC) decided to bring communities 
on board to help in the management of the state forest. In the resource sharing project, 
communities were now allowed to legally harvest products such as broom and thatch grasses, 
fruits and mushrooms, only to mention a few, but they were not allowed to harvest the high 
value commercial timber species. To some extend, the project went beyond the provisions of 
the Forestry Act, as this was illegal before the project started. 
 
4. THE MAFUNGAUTSI FOREST, ZIMBABWE 
Mafungautsi State Forest is located in Gokwe South District in Midlands Province, Zimbabwe 
(See figure 1). The forest has a total area of 82,100 hectares, which makes up 17% of the 
district. Communal areas in the district cover a total of 73%, while the remaining 10% is 
covered by national parks and small-scale commercial farms.  
 
  [Insert figure 1 approx here] 
 
Vegetation in Mafungautsi is predominantly Miombo woodland and the dominant tree species 
are Brachystaegia and Julbernadia (Vermeulen, 2000). The dominant soils in Mafungautsi 
forest are Kalahari sands and only a few patches can be found with sodic and heavy clay soils. 
The forest is a catchment area for four major rivers in Zimbabwe, namely; Sengwa, 
Mbumbusi, Ngondoma and Lutope. Conservation of the watershed was one of the main 
reasons why it was protected as a state forest in 1954. Mafungautsi forest is a source of 
                                                          
3 One must note here that after two decennia wherein community based approaches to conservation were the 
dominant paradigm, the end of the 1990’s saw more and more fundamental critique to these approaches. Some 
have even argued that the debate it now taking a U-turn ‘back to the barriers’; back to protectionist thinking. See 
Brechin et al, 2002; Hutton et al, 2005) 
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 several resources including pastures for grazing animals, thatching grass, broom grass, 
medicinal plants, honey, mushrooms, firewood, construction timber, game meat, Mopane 
worms4 indigenous fruits and herbs. The majority of stakeholders around Mafungautsi belong 
to two ethnic groups: Ndebele and Shona. A minority belong to the following ethnic groups: 
Tonga, Kalanga, Chewa and Shangwe. 
 
The initiation of a resource-sharing project in 1994 brought some changes in forest 
management in Mafungautsi forest. In line with the global governance climate that was then 
really beginning to shape up, the main aim of the project was to enable surrounding 
communities to take an active role in the management of the forest resources, leading to 
participation and ownership. Fifteen Resource Management Committees (RMCs) were set up 
in various communities surrounding the forest and their main role was to monitor and control 
harvesting of the resources, to which communities were now allowed access. The same aim of 
involving communities into joint management was central in the second phase of the project 
that started in 1999, but departed from totally different premises through the Adaptive 
Collaborative Management (ACM) approach. The next two sections describe these two 
phases. After that, they will be analysed according to the four global development principles 
that seem most appropriate and close to the ultimate goals set out by these projects: 
participation, ownership, good governance and capacity building. As the overall goal of the 
project has been termed sustainable development, we will also take this concept into account5. 
 
5. THE RESOURCE SHARING PROJECT: 1994-1999 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of what transpired after the launch of the resource-
                                                          
4 Mopane worms (imbresia belina) are edible and used as a relish when dried. 
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 sharing project, which was mainly driven by donors, the most important of which was CIDA6. 
The main activity after the launch of the resource-sharing project was the creation of 
Resource Management Committees (RMCs) in the communities surrounding the forest by the 
FC. RMCs were supposed to act as a link between the FC and the communities. Their main 
tasks involved administering permits for resource users to harvest the minor forest products, 
monitoring the harvesting process, opening and keeping a community bank account where the 
moneys raised through the permit system where to be kept and finally advising the 
community on how the funds could be spent. All of this had to ensure a sense of ownership 
with the communities which, so said the theory behind the project, was to lead to better 
community participation in sustainable forest management.  
 
The creation of the RMCs was the Forestry Commission’s way of operationalising the 
concepts of ownership and participation. However, the communities around Mafungautsi 
were never consulted and it was not clear how the new committee would fit in the already 
complex institutional landscape (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2002). Most communities were not 
clear on what the role of the RMCs was and hence saw them as an extended arm of the FC. 
This later brought in a lot of tensions. The RMCs themselves were accountable only to the FC 
and they did not pay due respect to the already existing traditional leadership structures. This 
in turn resulted in conflicts arising between traditional authorities and RMC members. For 
instance, when RMCs organised meetings, some village heads and their community members 
never came. Also, the way the RMCs were formed was mostly top-down. In some cases, the 
FC officer just send word that seven people from a community should come and see her. The 
people who came were then elected as the RMC committee. By now, it is generally accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 In what follows, one can undoubtedly distinguish more common buzzwords, such as ‘community’ and 
‘biodiversity’, which we agree with an anonymous reviewer also deserve scrutiny but we do not do so here due 
to space constraints. 
6 Canadian International Development Agency 
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 that the FC was not very genuine in its attempt to involve local people in the management of 
the forest, but merely wanted to recruit cheap labour from a number of community people to 
increase their forest guards. 
 
The RMCs were also told by the FC to open a bank account in order to deposit the money 
raised through the issuing of permits to resource harvesters in the forest. Although it was said 
to belong to the communities, a FC officer was a signatory to the account. The communities 
could not withdraw money without approval from the FC, showing the extended paternalistic 
spirit by the FC. Both the setting up of the RMCs and the bank account were, according to FC 
rhetoric, meant to empower the local people to manage and really make them the owners of 
the resources but in practice, this was never the case. The FC remained reluctant to hand-over 
power to the locals to make their own decisions about what basically were to be their own 
money and resources.  
 
Later in the project, these various conflicts were to be solved through the introduction of good 
governance. However, the several conflicts that continued to plague the project were never 
seriously addressed (Mutimukuru, 2004), whereby it seems that the FC judged the situation on 
the ground to be more stable than it actually was. No mechanisms were set up to really 
resolve the conflicts after the introduction of the resource sharing project. The good 
governance ‘mode’ of the FC was, similar to Pronk’s (2004) example, directed too much at 
conflict control, while a change in the institutional landscape, such as that of the introduction 
of the RMCs which aggravated the already existing conflicts tensions, rather called for an 
investment in longer-term conflict resolution, instead of short-term conflict control. As a 
result, the chaotic relationship that existed between the two major stakeholders never 
improved during the resource-sharing project, and the condition of the forest continued to 
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 deteriorate as communities continued to access the forest resources outside the project. 
 
In the end, it took a third party to break the impasse. In 1999, when CIDA had left and the 
Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR’s) Adaptive Collaborative Research 
(ACM) was initiated in the resource sharing project, the ACM researchers could not go to the 
field in a FC vehicle as any association with the FC would result in non-cooperation from the 
communities. The researchers had to separately meet with the two stakeholders at first to 
identify the type of conflicts and problems that existed. It took about a year for the relations 
among these stakeholders to improve. Nowadays, the relations have become better, after the 
conflict solution mechanisms employed by the team, and the communities do not mind 
anymore even if the researchers go to the field in a FC vehicle. 
 
6. THE ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH PROJECT 
1999 - 2003 
The lack of progress in the resource-sharing project was the entry point for introducing 
CIFOR’s ACM research project. The ACM approach7 was introduced to add value to the joint 
forest management scheme that was in place around Mafungautsi Forest between the Forestry 
Commission (on behalf of the State) and local communities. The scheme, as seen from the 
above, had not improved collaboration between the State and local communities, as had been 
intended at the start in 1994. Thus the focus of this CIFOR initiative was on developing 
approaches that would enhance learning and improvement on existing management systems.  
 
The main thrust of this research was to facilitate reform of management practices, institutional 
                                                          
7 ACM is a value-adding approach whereby individuals or groups who use or manage a forest, agree through a 
process of participatory action research to act together and draw up plans for their forests.  These plans are then 
implemented with the recognition that they may not fulfill their intended objectives. In this process, it is 
important for people to learn collaboratively from the implementation, as changes in the plans are negotiated. 
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 arrangements and policies in order to promote forest management systems that would lead to 
both human and ecological benefits. The project aimed at facilitating a shift away from 
blanket prescriptions of solving problems and moving towards locally based management that 
has freedom to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances in a manner that is in accordance with 
sustainable forest management and meeting the needs of local communities. The specific 
purpose was to facilitate widespread use of self-improving and equitable forest resource 
management systems that build on local capacity, ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ stakeholder 
interactions, and responds positively to external pressures.  
 
To kick off the research project, the ACM team conducted a baseline survey. One of the 
major finding of this baseline was that local people were passive and felt disempowered to 
actively participate in the management of the state forest. To break this passiveness, the 
research team facilitated local communities to go through a Training for Transformation (T 
for T) workshop, that was based on six principles developed by Paulo Freire: 1) no education 
is neutral as it can domesticate or liberate you, 2) education should be relevant, 3) education 
should promote dialogue, 4) education should encourage a process of reflection and learning, 
5) education should promote radical transformation and 6) people should be critical when 
trying to solve problems and searching for solutions.  
 
After the T for T workshop, communities were more confident and started to participate in the 
resource-sharing project differently than they had done before. Women and marginalized 
groups who used to be left out in management began to take an active role in issues 
concerning the forest resources. Currently, communities have even taken over the running of 
the project as the FC takes a back seat. Moreover, community members have not only 
monitored their activities in the forest, but have begun to actively monitor the functioning of 
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 the RMCs and demanding accountability. In cases where the RMCs were not performing 
according to the requirements of the community members, such RMCs have been removed 
from power and new members have been elected. In one RMC, Batanai, subcommittees that 
have been set up by the FC initiative in an effort to lesson the work done by RMC members 
have been dissolved as they failed to meet the community’s expectations.  
 
These developments were, besides the T for T workshops, also sparked by efforts to ‘build 
capacity’, something that had also been tried in the previous project, but had yielded little 
results. New efforts in the ACM project to build capacity of the communities around 
Mafungautsi included ‘look and learn’ tours, feedback and training workshops and several 
discussion and learning platforms that were created to enhance sharing of experiences and 
learning among stakeholders. An example of a look and learn tour is presented in box 1 
below.  
 
  [Insert box 1 approx here] 
 
In the above case of the ‘look and learn tour’ to Nyagadza, it is clear that capacity building 
was not only for local communities but also for the FC officers. Both stakeholders learnt 
about systems for sustainable harvesting and utilizing timber resources. After the tour, steps 
were taken by the FC officers to try and incorporate timber harvesting in the resource-sharing 
project. Other efforts to build capacity for the stakeholders involved training workshops – the 
FC officers and community representatives also went through training on participatory 
approaches and their implications. The FC officers also attended training workshops on the 
ACM approach and this helped them to gain a clearer conceptualization of participatory 
approaches in their extension work. Finally, in the various platforms that were organized, 
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 local potential was unlocked through sharing of experiences, learning among stakeholders at 
various levels, and this helped to ‘build capacity’ as well.  
 
The combined efforts in capacity building of both the FC and the community members 
resulted in more meaningful participation in the management of the forest than had previously 
been thought possible. Some empirical examples hereof can be found in the two boxes below. 
 
   [Insert box 2 & 3 approx here] 
 
These cases show that local people have been taking a lead in actively participating in the 
management of their resource. By coming up with new permit systems, stakeholders in 
Batanai show a keen interest in monitoring their firewood resource, and that they also want to 
ensure that their resources are sustained. This also applies to the Gababe case, where they also 
wanted to monitor their resource in addition to solving their equity problems. In both cases, 
local solutions were sought by local stakeholders in trying to deal with the problems they 
face, and unlike previously where participation by locals was by tokenism, here we see what 
is actually meant by participation emerging. 
 
After the introduction of the ACM research project, considerable time was spent in explaining 
what the project was all about and this greatly helped in creating ownership of the project by 
the local people. In the Chemwiro Masawi case (see box 5 below), the local people were 
anxious to know the role of the RMC according to the constitution. This was the first time that 
the constitution was explained to them, and when they now had knowledge about it, they were 
keen to start monitoring the performance of RMC members. Furthermore, communities 
became more proactive in assuring the representativeness of the new RMCs. The following 
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 case in box four illustrates this point. 
 
  [Insert box 4 approx here] 
 
The above case clearly shows that RMCs are no longer accountable to the FC only but also to 
the communities they represent, which is normally regarded as one element of good 
governance. This came about because the communities have taken an active role in 
monitoring the performance of their RMCs and those that do not perform well were dissolved. 
Another example of a case where communities demanded downward accountability by their 
RMCs is given below: 
 
  [Insert box 5 approx here] 
 
Facilitation of the various processes by the ACM team in Zimbabwe ended in 2003. To ensure 
that learning and collaboration processes would continue even after the ACM researchers 
withdrew, a strategy was developed to equip the local FC officers and community partners 
with facilitation skills. The FC officers were also trained in the ACM approach. This proved 
instrumental as community partners and FC officers remained actively involved in facilitating 
the learning processes. It is also important to highlight that the researchers did not pull out 
drastically, but did so gradually. At first, the researchers offered considerable back-up support 
to the two main facilitators, the community partners and the FC officers. However, this 
support decreased as time went on and stakeholders became more confident in organising and 
facilitating the learning processes. The researchers have now become mere observers as 
learning processes continue to unfold with the facilitation of the community partners and the 
FC officers.  
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7. ANALYSIS: BEYOND BUZZWORDS? 
The two phases of the Mafungautsi Resource Sharing Project show clear differences in terms 
of success. The resource sharing project generally failed to meet any of the goals behind 
participation, ownership, good governance, capacity building and thus sustainable forest 
management. To the contrary, the ACM project did manage to meet many of the goals set out 
by the resource sharing project, while putting emphasis on the same buzzwords, but taking a 
whole different approach altogether. Here we will shortly analyse the key differences of the 
two projects in terms of the five buzzwords concerned. 
 
Before the ACM team intervention in 1999, although the policy was flexible to allow for the 
resource sharing project to take place as an experiment, events in practice did not portray this. 
The FC did not trust that communities could also effectively participate in the project, but 
since the donors were funding this project, buzzwords such as capacity building, participation 
and community empowerment dominated most discussions about the resource sharing project 
even though there was incomplete understanding of what exactly these words meant. For 
example, capacity building of communities, in order for them to effectively participate in the 
project, had been high on the agenda, but never materialised. Government and FC officials’ 
perceptions on what needed to be done in order to ‘build capacity’, differed greatly from what 
is generally understood by the term: to increase the competence (intellectual, financial, 
economic, etc.) of the communities in order for them to become better equipped partners in 
the project. The FC continued to operate as they used to do before the project, with policing 
being their main approach for ‘good governance’ and management, leading to an increase in 
the arrest of community members and subsequent worsening of the relations. Hence, the 
introduction of capacity building of communities did not have any effect in the project as the 
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 actors that had to do this capacity building saw the concept as void of any meaning, other than 
its use of political legitimation. Capacity building thus works both ways and it would have 
been better if the FC officials had had training in order to change their own perceptions. 
 
After the introduction of the resource-sharing project, communities were required to actively 
participate in the management of the forest and yet they were ill equipped to do so. Because 
of their past history, communities had the belief that the government forest officials knew 
everything and they knew nothing. Even during the initial stages of the ACM research project, 
communities refused to answer any questions and told the researchers that they did not know 
anything. Even though the two major stakeholders, the FC and communities were supposed to 
collaborate and manage the forest resource, the FC continued to dominate while communities 
continued with their ‘business as usual.’ Participation by communities was therefore by 
tokenism and upon this realisation – further reinforced by Zimbabwe becoming an 
international pariah -, the donor, CIDA, instead of trying to see how things could be changed, 
decided to pull out of the project and leave it in limbo. 
 
After the introduction of the ACM approach, there has been an evolution of a new partnership 
between the two major stakeholders, the FC and communities that have resulted in the better 
management strategies and the improvement of human lives.  After the training in the ACM 
approach, the FC officers had moved from being teachers to being learners, and increasingly 
appreciated local people’s knowledge. This resulted in the two main partners learning from 
each other and improvements in the management of the resource compared to the initial stage 
where the FC claimed to know everything and regarded communities as lacking knowledge. 
In recent developments, the two partners have also started initiating joint learning processes 
and they have participated in look and learn trips whereby both community members and 
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 local people visited a carpentry project in Chipinge in the Manicaland province of Zimbabwe. 
 
In the new project, deliberate effort was put in building the capacity of the local stakeholders. 
After realising that local people had inertia, the ACM team organised the T for T workshop, 
which helped to boost the local stakeholders’ confidence and level the playing field. In 
addition to the T for T workshop, researchers also used other methods to try and break 
passiveness by communities. For instance, through facilitation by researchers, previously 
marginalized groups were deliberately given platforms to express themselves, and take lead in 
issues that concerned them. This helped a lot in raising the confidence of women. Invitations 
for most of the workshops organized by the researchers, were deliberately extended to mostly 
women, and other marginalized groups, and this also boosted their participation in the 
processes, and also enhanced their confidence and self-belief.  
 
After the ACM research project, community participation in resource management and 
decision-making processes was enhanced and by making decisions the local stakeholders also 
demanded more genuine ownership of the project. As forest product user groups implemented 
their action plans, their collaboration with the RMC, FC and other district level stakeholders 
improved. Forest users now had a means of engaging with both the RMC and Forestry 
Commission on their terms, and this improved their collaboration. As a result of this 
improved collaboration, communities’ perceptions towards the Forestry Commission became 
more positive, they began to see the FC as more of an ally than a hindrance to resource 
access. All in all, the latest developments in Mafungautsi have instigated a more regulated and 
balanced approach to meeting the needs of the communities, while not over harvesting the 
forest resources. Perhaps it is too soon to call this ‘sustainable forestry development’, but 
steps in the right direction have surely been made. 
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8. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
As is clear from the foregoing, it is not so much the specific wording that is used that made 
the difference between the two phases of the project. Rather, the difference lies in who 
operationalises a buzzword like participation or ownership and how. Of course, this in itself is 
nothing new, but what the Mafungautsi case clearly illustrates is that discursive pressure 
involved in a donor instigated project makes it much more susceptible to problems of 
unfitting ideological operationalisation, contradictions and lack of meaning because of 
political legitimation. However, the case also shows that this conclusion is not unavoidable. 
When ACM researchers from CIFOR came with a different approach that focused on 
enhancing social learning and collaboration among stakeholders, local community members 
got an opportunity to come to grips with their problems – and possible solutions – on their 
own terms. 
 
Donor money almost always comes with conditions. In the Mafungautsi case, the FC had to 
adopt the resource sharing approach which was directly influenced by the emerging global 
governance agenda where people had to move from top-down approaches – to people oriented 
approaches through buzzwords such as ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ of local people. 
Coming back to our three ways of how buzzwords often work out in reality, as noted in the 
theoretical section, it can be concluded that for the case of Mafungautsi State Forest, the 
buzzwords were not clearly defined at that level and stayed just buzzwords with no local 
meaning and were mainly used by the Forestry Commission to legitimate donor funds.  
 
Moreover, it can be concluded that the various global governance buzzwords work out 
differently in different situations. The Mafungautsi case showed for example that the term 
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 capacity building was mostly used for purposes of political legitimation, while the adhering to 
good governance in the project showed internal contradictions in the way conflicts ought to be 
managed. Above all, the buzzwords lacked meaning at the local level and subsequently made 
implementation complicated. The resource-sharing project was immediately implemented by 
the FC without much consideration of other factors that were crucial if the project was to be 
successful in enhancing real effective participation of local people. Such factors could 
include: levelling the playing field; besides only building capacity for local communities, also 
building capacity for government workers on people oriented approaches; and training in 
order to change perceptions of capabilities of local people and executing real good 
governance through conflict resolution mechanisms. Things that we saw happening in the 
ACM project. 
 
All of this leads to the bigger debate on the effectiveness and legitimacy of development 
cooperation through donors and international institutions. To find a case in Zimbabwe, now 
internationally under much pressure and stigmatised as a negative spiral downwards, where 
certain things are actually improving after a change of donors8, at least points to the 
conclusion that buzzwords can indeed ‘retain the potential to catalyse and underpin genuine 
processes of transformation’ (Hicky and Mohan, 2005: 257). This is an important conclusion 
in a time whereby many donors and development practitioners merely seem to put emphasis 
on correct project processes whereby all the ‘right elements (buzzwords) can be found, rather 
than on how these elements are implemented in such a way that they take into account local 
realities and power dynamics. The above case therefore again prove that not only a critical 
rethinking of the development process is necessary. Arguably even more important, it 
confirms that donors and development practitioners should accept critical thinking by local 
 24
 recipients of aid vis-à-vis global governance buzzwords and stimulate the flexible and local 
interpretation thereof. 
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